

Message Text

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ACTION EA-13

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 PM-07 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01

DPW-01 RSR-01 MC-02 ACDA-10 AID-10 PRS-01 /081 W

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O R 120835Z JUL 73

FM AMCONSUL BIEN HOA

TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 030

AMCONSUL CAN THO

AMCONSUL DA NANG

AMCONSUL NHA TRANG

USDAO SAIGON

USSAG NKP AB

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BIEN HOA 281

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MILI VC

SUBJECT: WEYAND VISIT TO MR 3

1. THE JULY 11 MR 3 VISIT OF GENERAL FRED WEYAND, DESIGNATED VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY WENT OFF VERY WELL. HE WAS GIVEN COMPREHENSIVE BRIEFING BY III CORPS STAFF AND CHATTS WITH MR 3 CG LTG NGUYEN VAN MINH ABOUT CURRENT SITUATION IN THIS MILITARY REGION. WEYAND TOLD MINH HE WAS BACK IN VIET-NAM TO CHECK ON SUPPLY PROBLEMS, FIND OUT FROM HIS VIETNAMESE FRIENDS WHAT THEY THOUGHT COMMUNISTS MIGHT DO WHEN BOMBING HAULTS IN CAMBODIA, AND TO REASSURE PRESIDENT THIEU USG IS STILL CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT HAPPENS HERE. THE BRIEFING, OUR TRANSLATION OF WHICH FOLLOWS, PROVIDED ANSWERS TO GENBUZL'S QUESTIONS.

2. ENEMY FORCES

A. ENEMY TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION: THE TERRITORY OF MR 3 (WITH EXCEPTION OF ALMOST GT MOENFKJE BUGFH TUY PROVINCE IS DIVIDED
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BY THE COMMUNITY INTO TWO MRS: MR 4 CONSISTS OF PPTUGON CAPITAL, GIA DINH SECTOR, CU CHI DISTRICT (HAU NGHIA PROVINCE), PHU HOA DISTRICT (BINH DUONG), AND PROBABLY THE SOUTHERN PART OF LAI THIEU DISTRICT (BINH DUONG) AND PART OF DI AN DISTRICT (BIEN HOA). MR 1

(OR EASTERN MRPS CONSISTS OF BINH PHUOC, THU DAU MOT, TAY NINH, LONG AN, BIEN HOA AND BA LONG PROVINCES, WAR ZONE "C" AND RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE. THE RVN BINH TUY PROVINCE IS CALLED BINH TAN PROVINCE BY THE COMMUNISTS AND IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THEIR MR 6.

B. ENEMY STRENGTH: THE ENEMY STRENGTH IN MR 3 IS 70,900

INCLUDING:

HARD CORE	25,490
REGIONAL	912,800
GUERRILLA	1,890
POLITICAL CADRE	9,160
MILITARY, POLITICAL AND REAR SERVICE	21,560

EVEN THOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN 4970 COMMUNIST TROOPS NEUTRALIZED IN MR 3 SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE, THE ENEMY HAS INCREASED HIS STRENGTH BY 8500 MEMBERS AS COMPARED WITH THE STRENGTH BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE BECAME IN-FORCE (EXCLUDING ALMOST 9000 POW'S WHO HAVE RECENTLY BEEN RELEASED BY GVN AT LOC CSNH, MINH THANH AND THIEN NGON). THIS STRENGTH IS EQUIVALENT TO WHAT IT WAS IN APRIL 1972 WHEN THE COMMUNISTS STARTED THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE. HOWEVER, TNB COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMUNIST TROOP AT PRESENT IS ONLY 60PERCENT AS COMPARED WITH THAT IN EARLY APRIL LAST YEAR.

C. ENEMY STRENGTH COMPOSITIONS: THE ENEMY FORCES IN MR 3

INCLUDE:

(1) UNITS UNDER THE COSVN CONTROL:

5TH INFANTRY DIV. (174TH REGIMENT)

7TH INFANTRY DIV.

9TH INFANTRY DIV. (272ND REGIMENT)

429TH SAPPER BRIGADE

INDEPENDENT INFANTRY REGIMENTS: 201ST (PLUS), 205TH,

271ST/ INDEPENDENT, C-50, 180TH/R PROTECTION

69TH (OR 75TH) ARTILLERY GROUP

THREE TANK BATTALIONS

(2) UNITS UNDER MR 1 CONTROL: 101, 33, 274, E.1, ETC.

(3) UNITS UNDER MR 4 CONTROL: F.20 BN, F.30 BN, F.40 BN,

D.115 SAPPER BN AND WATER SAPPERS

(4) UNITS UNDER MR 6 CONTROL.

D. ENEMY DEPLOYMENT:

9TH DIVISION/REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS AT XT 650710

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271ST REGIMENT/9TH DIVISION AT XT534475

95C REGIMENT/9TH DIVISION AT XT550400

7TH DIVISION/REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS AT XT 882530

141ST REGIMENT/7TH DIVISION AT XT 950610

209TH REGIMENT/7TH DIVISION AT XT 845526

165TH REGIMENT/7TH DIVISION AT XT 952433

201ST REGIMENT/RHQ AT XT 820900

205TH REGIMENT/RHQ AT XT 740787

271ST SEPARATE REGIMENT/RHQ AT XTNAMDOQOT

101ST REGIMENT ATOMIT523348

CTP REGIMENT AT XT 390560

33RD REGIMENT AT YT 220170

274TH REGIMENT AT YS 260850

1ST REGIMENT/PHUOC BINHY AT YU 080130
69TH ARTY DIVISION/RHQ AT XT 525810
42D HOWITZER REGIMENT/69TH ARTY DIVISION AT XU 870050
271ST ANTCJAIRCRAFT REGIQD
GUDYOTH ARTY DIV. AT XT 580890
208TH ROCKET REGIMENT/19TH ARTY DIVISION AT XT 590620
E.210 ANTI AIRCRAFT REGIMENT
429TH SAPPER BRIGADE/RHQ AT XT 550560

3. ENEMY ACTIVITIES SINCE CEASE-FIRE

A. VIOLATION RATES: ER

N THOUGH THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

WAS SIGNED FIVE AND A HALF MONTHS AGO, THE FIRING HAS NOT DIED DOWN IN SOUTH VIET-NAM GENERALLY AND IN MR 3 IN PARTICULAR. AS OF NOW, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE COMMITTED A TOTAL OF 4187 VIOLATIONS.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE PERIOD OF TIME WHEN THE ICCS WAS NOT YET ACTUALLY ON DUTY, THE COMMUNISTS IN MR 3 HAVE CONDUCTED A SERIES OF ATTACKS AGAINST VILLAGES/HAMLETS AND THE KEY LOC'S IN THE POPULATED LOW-LAND PROVINCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF OCCUPYING LAND, CONTROLLING PEOPLE AND TRYING TO ISOLATE SAIGON. IN THE TWO WEEKS FROM 28 JANUARY TO 7 FEBRUARY 1973, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE COMMITTED MORE THAN 600 VIOLATIONS, OR AN AVERAGE OF 300 VIOLATIONS PER WEEK. SINCE 7 FEBRUARY 1973, AFTER THE ARVN FORCES HAD REOCCUPIED COMMUNIST-INFILTRATED HAMLETS, RE-ESTABLISHED TRAFFIC ON THE KEY LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND CAUSED HEAVY LOSSES TO THE ENEMY UNITS, ENEMY ACTIVITIES HAVE GRADUALLY DEGREESSED, BUT THE AVERAGE RATE IS STILL 180 VIOLATIONS PER WEEK. TODAY, 28 DAYS AFTER A JOINT
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COMMUNIQUE WAS SIGNED IN PARIS, THE RATE IS 90 VIOLATIONS PER WEEK. MOST OF THE VIOLATIONS DURING THIS TIME ARE FIRE ATTACKS, HARRASSMENTS, MINE PLANTINGS, TERRORIST ACTS, ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS.

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF ENEMY ACTIVITIES

(1) AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE, THE COMMUNISTS CONTINUED TO REINFORCE THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIET-NAM IN GENERAL AND IN MR 3 IN PARTICULAR.

12,000 NVA SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN PENETRATED AS REPLACEMENTS FOR UNITS OPERATING IN MR 3.

A NUMBER OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT (ARMORED CARS AND TANKS, 122MM AND 130MM GUNS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT CANNONS) HAS BEEN SENT TO MR 3 BATTLEFIELDS.

(2) IN SPITE OF THEIR HEAVY LOSSES IN THE ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY LAND AND CONTROL PEOPLE, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE MAINTAINED A RELATIVELY HIGH RATE OF ACTIVITIES IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE GVN FORCES AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, SUPPORT THE VCI CONSOLIDATION AND DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES.

UNQUOTE.

APPLING

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O R 120853Z JUL 73

FM AMCONSUL BIEN HOA

TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 031

AMCONSUL CAN THO

AMCONSUL DA NANG

AMCONSUL NHA TRANG

USDAO SAIGON IMMEDIATE

USSAG NKP AB THAILAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BIEN HOA 0281 L I M D I S

(3) THE COMMUNISTS ARE MAKING AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE AND EXTEND THEIR AREAS BY BUILDING HOUSES, ESTABLISHING VILLAGES AND TRYING TO INDUCE PEOPLE MOVE TO CONTROLLED AREAS, WHICH ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- AT THREE BOUNDARY PROVINCES: TAY NINH, BINH LONG AND PHUOC LONG.
- SAIGON RIVER CORRIDOR AND BASES OF LONG NGUYEN, BA HAO, BOI LOI AND HO BO.
- BASES OF LA NGA, TRANG TAO, MAY TAO, XUYEN MOC AND HAT DICH.
- MO VET BASE AND INFILTRATION CORRIDOR INTO HAU NGHIA AND WEST OF CMD.

(4) THE COMMUNISTS HAVE INCREASED AND ARE STILL INCREASING LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES:

MANY TRUCKS USE LTL.20, QL.22, TL.246, TL.244, QL-13, QL-14A AND LTL-1A AND LOGGING TRUCK ROADS TO TRANSPORT FOOD, WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FROM THE BASES OF 354, MIMOT AND SNOUL TO SECRETE AT WAREHOUSES ESTABLISHED IN WAR ZONE "C", LOC NINH, BU DOP, PHU RIENG, THUAN LOI, WAR ZONE "D", LONG NGUYEN AND BA HAO BASES. FROM THESE AREAS, FOOD, WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION ARE DISTRIBUTED BY BICYCLES TO UNITS OPERATING DEEPLY IN MR3.

4. ENEMY POLICIES FOR ACTION

AT PRESENT THE COMMUNISTS ARE PREPARING TO BE ADAPTABLE WITH THE CONFIDENTIAL

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TWO FOLLOWING FOLICIES:

A. POLICY 1

ACCEPT THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE WITH TROOP PROSELYTIZING AND SUPPORTING ARM STRUGGLE UNDER GUERRILLA FORM.

B. POLICY 2

LAUNCH LIMITED ATTACKS INTO LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN ORDER TO:

- SUPPORT THE POLITICAL NEGOTIATION
- PROBE THE REACTION OF THE ARVN AND USAF
- CONSOLIDATE AND EXTEND CONTROLLED AREAS

5. CONCLUSION

IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EITHER OF THE ABOVE POLICIES, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY POWER IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE.

MANY INDICATIONS SHOW THAT THE COMMUNISTS WILL APPLY POLICY 1 IN ORDER TO CREATE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR NVN TO RESTORE ITS ECONOMY, RECEIVE US AID FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION, HELP THE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIET NAM, AND HAVE TIME TO REORGANIZE THEIR RANKS AND STRENGTHEN THEIR FORCES WHICH HAVE SUFFERED GREAT CASUALTIES IN THE LAST FEW YEARS OF THIS FIERCE WAR.

HOWEVER, IF POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS COME TO A DEADLOCK,

THE COMMUNISTS WILL APPLY POLICY 2. THEY WILL CHOOSE SOME OBJECTIVES TO ATTACK TO PROVE THE REACTIONS OF THE ARVN AND USAF,

AND AT THE SAME TIME PROTECT AND EXTEND THEIR AREAS OF CONTROL.

5. WE ARE EXPERIENCING SHORTAGES IN TWO AREA: POL AND ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.

POL WAS NOT ADEQUATELY ISSUED FOR THE UNITS' NECESSARY OPERATIONS SUCH AS:

SUPPLIES OF ALL KINDS (I, II, III, IV AND V)

GENERATORS FOR

- PROVIDING LIGHT FOR COMPOUNDS AND DISPENSARIES
- PROVIDING LIGHT FOR THE DEFENSE SYSTEMS OF COMPOUNDS
- PROVIDING LIGHT FOR THE BRIDGE PROTECTION
- PROVIDING ELECTRICITY FOR THE SIGNAL SYSTEMS

REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF ALL MACHINES

DEFENSIVE ACTIONS AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES (INCLUDING TANK AND ARTILLERY UNITS)

ESCORT FOR CONVOYS

ROAD SECURITY

TROOP MOVEMENTS

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POL WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONS:

- HIGHWAY AND DEPENDANT CAMP CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
- DEFENSE PROJECTS
- CLEARING SUPPLY LINES
- DEFOLIATION
- SPECIAL SECURITY OPERATIONS
- TRAINING OF UNITS

6. COMPARISONS OF POL ALLOCATIONS IN THE THIRD LOGISTICAL AREA BETWEEN THE FIRST/SECOND QUARTERS 1973 AND THE FOURTH QUARTER 1972.

A.

FOURTH QUARTER 1972

FIRST QUARTER 1973

GASOLINE DIESEL GASOLINE DIESEL COMPARED WITH

24,092,000 20,820,000 24,592,000 22,820,000 1ST QTR 1972

GAS PLUS
500,000

CNFDR DIESEL PLUS
IF PB/ 2,000,000

SECOND QUARTER 1973

GASOLINE DIESEL COMPARED WITH
1ST QTR 1973
16,512,000 16,325,000 GASOLINE MINUS
HT 8,080,000
DIESEL MINUS
6,495,000

B. POL REQUIREMENT OF UNITS SUPPORTED BY 3RD LOGISTICAL AREA
DURING THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1973.

REQUIREMENTS		ISSUED		SHORTAGE	
GASOLINE	DIESEL	GASOLINE	DIESEL	GASOLINE	DIESEL

15,283,445	16,498,043	10,530,000	6,900,000	4,753,445	9,598,043
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7. ARTILLERY AMMUNITION (105 AND 155) HAS BEEN REDUCED
PROGRESSIVELY SINCE JANUARY 1973. IN JANUARY WE WERE ISSUED
200,000 ROUNDS OF 105 AND 34,590 ROUNDS OF 155. FOR THE CURRENT
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MONTH (JULY) WE WERE ISSUED 42,000 ROUNDS OF 105 AND
7,350 ROUNDS OF 155.

8. THE FOLLOWING SHOWS WHAT WAS ISSUED, CONSUMED AND SHORTFALL
FROM JANUARY TO JULY 1973:

	105 MM		155MM				
MONTH	ISSUED	CONSUMED	SHORT	EXTRAS	ISSUED	CONSUMED	SHORT EXTRAS
JAN.	200,000	174,430	34,590	31,432			
FEB.	121,500	184,616	28,980	38,280			
MAR.	42,000	66,058	10,000	7350	21,291	2,000	
ARP.	42,000	49,664	7350	8826			
MAY	42,000	38,054	7350	6874			
JUN	42,000	58246	20,000	7350	16,944	10,000	
JUL	42,000	21,915	25,187	7350	5769	5,930	

9. COMMENT: MINH WAS ESPECIALLY PLEASED WITH THE VISIT AND READ INTO
IT THAT THE USG WAS INDEED VITALLY INTERESTED IN THE FUTURE
OF THIS COUNTRY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD FAITH IN GENERAL
WEYAND, EMPHASIZING THE POINT THAT WEYAND WAS VIEWED AS A "FRIEND"
IN GVN OFFICIAL CIRCLES, AND THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THE GENERAL
WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO HELP VIET-NAM IF THE NEED EVER AROSE.

WALINSHAW

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